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Composition of Innovative Activity in ICT
Equipment R&D
Yasin Ozcan and Shane Greenstein*
Has the market structure for inventive ideas in the Information and
Communications Technology (“ICT”) equipment industry undergone
dramatic changes in the last three decades in the United States? What
does statistical evidence from U.S. patent activity suggest about change
to the concentration of sources of inventive ideas? This Study
characterizes levels, and changes in those levels, in the concentration of
sources of new invention from 1976 to 2010. The analysis finds pervasive
deconcentration across a wide set of areas. It also finds that the
deconcentration takes place despite the role lateral entry by existing
firms plays in driving concentration levels up. Furthermore, the evidence
suggests that the deconcentration trend cannot be attributed to a single
supply factor in the market for ideas, such as the breakdown of AT&T
during the deregulation of the telecommunications industry.
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INTRODUCTION
It is not an exaggeration to say that the market structure for the
Information and Communications Technology (“ICT”) equipment
industry in the United States has undergone enormous changes in the last
three decades. This Study focuses on one aspect of these changes:
namely, the concentration of origin of innovative ideas—a new method,
idea, or product. Thirty years ago, most innovation took place in
established firms—particularly large, centrally controlled laboratories,
such as Bell Labs and IBM Labs. While such activity continues, analysts
noticed decades ago that such labs had lost their prominence to
widespread, decentralized, and small-scale innovators.1 This observation
about the origins of inventive activity goes by many names in many
models.2 This Study uses the label “divided technical leadership”
(“DTL”).3 DTL plays a key role in models of open innovation4 and in
models of open and proprietary platforms.5 It also plays a key role in
models of the externalization of research and development (“R&D”) by
large firms that use acquisitions of smaller firms for many of these
innovative activities.6 Firms such as Cisco, IBM, and Apple participate
1. Richard S. Rosenbloom & William J. Spencer, Introduction: Technology’s Vanishing
Wellspring, in ENGINES OF INNOVATION: U.S. INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AT THE END OF AN ERA 1,
3 (Richard S. Rosenbloom & William J. Spencer eds., 1996) (“Research activities have been
downsized, redirected, and restructured in recent years within most of the firms that were among
the largest sponsors of industrial research.”).
2. Rosenbloom and Spencer discuss the importance of research from laboratories, but also the
rise of small scale research in start-ups and other young firms. See id. Sometimes this is called
“Silicon Valley Style” R&D, or “entrepreneurial” R&D. Related labels are discussed in the text.
3. Timothy F. Bresnahan & Shane Greenstein, Technological Competition and the Structure of
the Computer Industry, 47. J. INDUS. ECON. 1, 1–40 (1999) (discussing the market structure
concept of DTL).
4. HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING AND
PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY 43 (2003).
5. Shane Greenstein, Innovative Conduct in U.S. Commercial Computing and Internet Markets,
in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 477, 493 (Bronwyn Hall & Nathan Rosenberg
eds., 2010).
6. Joshua S. Gans et al., When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative
Destruction?, 33 RAND J. ECON. 571, 571 (2002).
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in such activities, each having made more than 100 acquisitions over the
last two decades.
While the trend has received notice, examination of its causes has not
moved much beyond casual empirism and anecdote. This Study
addresses the absence of statistical information and econometric analysis
by providing an examination of the long run causes behind DTL. It
examines whether statistical evidence of long-term changes shows a
deconcentration of sources of inventive ideas, as held by conventional
models of DTL.7 This Study also provides the first characterization of
levels and changes in those levels in the concentration of origins of
innovation in the ICT equipment industry. To construct measures of the
origins of innovation, this Study examines the concentration in granted
patents in ICT equipment from 1976 to 2010.8 The data reveal very large
changes over time, which motivates a second question: what are the
determinants of deconcentration? This part of the Study uses variance
between different segments to identify determinants of changes in
concentration. The statistical exercise measures the contribution of
economies of scope, product market leadership and entry by domestic
and foreign firms from 1976 to 2010.
This Study utilizes a data set constructed from XML and text files of
patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
between 1976 and 2010. The newly constructed data covers four more
recent years than National Bureau of Economic Research (“NBER”)
patent data files, the standard data source for many studies on patents.9
There are several reasons to use this data. ICT equipment is an important
downstream market, involving hundreds of billions of dollars of
investment by end users. The creation of equipment upstream is a
knowledge-intensive and patent-intensive activity, accounting for
roughly 14% of all U.S. patents.10 This data also suits the goal of
7. By deconcentration we mean a change in the composition of the sources of inventive ideas,
away from a small number of firms to many more. We will propose a way to implement how to
measure deconcentration in this Study.
8. The “granted patents” of this Study will encompass all those issued by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”), and the date of issuance will be the date associated with their grant.
9. For details on the NBER patent data files, see Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent
Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001) [hereinafter Data File] (“The goal of this paper is to
describe the data base on U.S. patents.”). This is a widely used source of patent data, primarily
because prior researchers have cleaned the files of misspellings and other errors, and made them
compatible with other common sources of data.
10. This figure is the ratio of the number of patents in Information and Communications
Technology Equipment (“ICTE”) Industry to the number of patents in all technology classes in the
U.S., covering the period from 1976 to 2010. The patents for the ICTE Industry consist of patents
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analyzing long-term trends and factors more comprehensively than prior
research; as explained in the text, the length of time covered is novel.
The findings first cover long-term trends. The Study reveals a grain
of truth to conventional belief about the presence of DTL. We show that
a deconcentration trend is present in the ownership of new patent
applications.
Interestingly, the analysis documents considerable
variation in the size and scope of the changes; while some segments of
ICT equipment have undergone dramatic changes in concentration,
others have undergone less dramatic change. Overall, however, the data
reveal a dramatic decline in concentration. While on average the top
twenty-five firms accounted for 72% of the new patents in 1976, the top
twenty-five firms accounted for only 55% of the new patent grants by the
end of the sample. Furthermore, this trend of deconcentration is even
starker when the sample is restricted to high-quality patents based on the
citations received by each patent, with a decline in top twenty-five firms’
ownership from 86% to 62% over the same period.11
Why does this deconcentration arise? On the supply side, large firms
in some industries may be utilizing economies of scope by entering new
technical areas for their invention, which may appear as increased or
decreased concentration depending on the size of the entry.12 This Study
uses such lateral entry as a proxy for economies of scope, and, as shown
below, finds evidence that ownership concentration increases with lateral
entry. In addition, this Study provides evidence that de novo firm entry,
which may be used as a proxy for reduced transaction costs of entry by
inexperienced firms, accounts for part of this deconcentration, but not all
types of entry. Importantly, this Study rejects the notion that non-U.S.
firm entry caused the change, which is important to test because the U.S.
economy began to involve a larger fraction of imports and exports over
this period.13 Rather, established changes in concentration may come
in forty-four (44) technology classes based on the USPTO classification system. More information
on the data is provided in the Data Section and in the Appendices.
11. As we explain in the text, a high-quality patent is one that receives a number of “forward”
citations, namely, citations from patents that come later, and the number of forward citations places
the patent among the top quartile of all patents receiving citations.
12. In the context of production, “economies of scope” is usually defined as lowering the
average cost of producing two or more products. In the context of invention, “economies of scope”
refers to the lowering of the average costs of inventing in two or more technical areas.
13. As with the rest of the literature, we are somewhat cautious in our interpretation of foreign
firms. A patent owned by Sony, for example, will appear as a U.S. patent due to the location of its
U.S.-based subsidiary. As with the prior literature, see, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall, Exploring the
Patent Explosion, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 35 (2005) [hereinafter Patent Explosion], we focus on
changes due to U.S. patents with U.S assignees and non-U.S assignees, and examine whether the
surge in patenting with non-U.S assignees accounts for change.
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from two distinct areas of the ownership distribution: (1) declines in the
leading, large firms, and (2) an increase of innovation in small and
entrepreneurial firms within the U.S. These entry results are consistent
with the growth of small and entrepreneurial firms as a source of ideas.
Evidence for the decline in the importance of large firms is more
mixed. This Study provides evidence that decreases in product market
leadership explain the deconcentration in some instances. However, the
preponderance of evidence suggests this is not the single most important
factor explaining variance across technical areas, which we define below.
More specifically, this Study reveals that long-term trends in
deconcentration cannot be fully accounted for by the divestiture of
AT&T,14 or the loss in commercial leadership at IBM, Motorola, or any
other large firm in the industry. 15 Hence, this Study rejects the most
sweeping version of the hypothesis that points to one antitrust case, one
company’s strategic error, or the break-up of one large, leading innovator
of yesteryear as the cause for this change in structure.
This Study relates to the research streams in two main channels. First,
the deconcentration of ownership relates to the literature on DTL, as
noted, and more broadly, debates about the causes of market leadership
in innovative activities. Following this literature,16 this Study generally
distinguishes between product market leadership and technological
leadership, and focuses on the latter. Second, this is the first Study to
investigate the scope and cause of deconcentration in innovation in the
ICT equipment industry specifically. Finally, this Study differs from
prior literature with its focus on understanding the causes behind changes
in technical leadership in the more recent decades, an unexamined
question in prior work. This Study establishes this novelty with a more
detailed comparison and contrasts with prior research.
This Study also builds on prior research into patenting. The dramatic
increase in U.S. patenting activity since the 1970s has attracted the

14. As discussed below, the divestiture of AT&T broke AT&T into seven regional local
telephone companies and one other firm that combined a long distance telephone company with a
telephone equipment firm. It also divided Bell Labs into two entities, one for the long
distance/equipment firm, and another for the consortium of local firms. After this division Bell
Labs began to decline in size.
15. As discussed below, IBM and Motorola both had leading positions as technical pioneers
and providers of computing and cellular telephone equipment, respectively. Over the course of the
period covered by our patents both firms would lose market share in output markets.
16. This literature is reviewed in Greenstein, supra note 5. Technological leadership refers to
activities––principally innovation––that lead a firm to introduce and implement a new product or
service. Commercial leadership refers to activities––chiefly production and distribution––that lead
a firm to gain larger market share at the expense of rivals.
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attention of scholars: Kortum and Lerner investigated the U.S. patenting
activity, finding that changes in U.S. patent policy—specifically the
establishment of the U.S. Court of Appeals to hear patent cases—did not
have a verifiable impact on the increased patenting activity. 17 Instead,
Kortum and Lerner associated the increase in patenting to an increase in
U.S. innovation and changes in the management of R&D, which may
have included actions such as reallocating efforts to more applied
problems with higher patent yields.18 Kim and Marschke analyzed the
same issue, concluding that the increased patenting activity resulted from
increases in R&D in some sectors, and increases in the patent yield in the
computing, electronics, and auto sectors.19 Hall found that growth
occurred in complex product industries such as telecommunications,
where products are based not only on a single patent, but on multiple and
technically complementary patents.20 She further concluded that
increased patenting activity by firms in complex product industries
spilled over to those firms’ patenting behavior in other industries,
resulting in an overall increase in patenting activity across all technology
classes.21
These studies mostly focused on activity at the technology class level
as described in NBER patent data files.22 In contrast, this Study focuses
on the distribution of the increase in patenting between firms within each
technology class, or in other words, differs by looking at the technical
leadership of firms in addition to the main trends in the technology class
level. Furthermore, the up-to-date data on patents allow this Study to
answer the open questions suggested by earlier studies, including: “What
happened during the 1990s? Did the positive premium for entry with
patents continue during the rapid growth of the computing and
electronics sector in the late 1990s? Has the growth in patenting
continued to be due almost entirely to U.S. firms in computing and

17. Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, What Is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting?, 28 RES.
POL’Y 1 (1998).
18. See id. at 4 (“[T]he increase in patent activity here seems to be a consequence of a
worldwide increase, along with a recent improvement in the relative performance of U.S.
inventors.”).
19. See Jinyoung Kim & Gerald G. Marschke, Accounting for the Recent Surge in U.S.
Patenting: Changes in R&D Expenditures, Patent Yields, and the High Tech Sector, 13 ECON.
INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 543 (2004).
20. Bronwyn H. Hall et al., Market Value and Patent Citations 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7741, 2000), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0cs6v2w7.
21. See Patent Explosion, supra note 13, at 46.
22. For details on the NBER patent data files, see Data File, supra note 9.
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electronics?”23
This Study supports the view that the changes in ownership
concentration are consistent with a trend towards divided technical
leadership, namely, more widespread access to the fundamental
knowledge and building blocks for innovative activity in this sector of
the economy. This is the framework put forward in Bresnahan and
Greenstein, which suggests that platforms in an industry with rapid
technological development can be quite concentrated if leading firms
retain proprietary rights over standards.24 In the face of technological
competition between platforms, however, it is possible for different firms
to take the leading position on different segments of the platform.25
Hence, high rates of firm entry and exit may occur without changing the
concentration at the platform level.26 This Study contributes to the
literature by providing considerable evidence consistent with the central
premise: that DTL has increased over time in inventive ideas upstream to
computing and related sectors, such as Internet equipment, both prior to
the period analyzed by Bresnahan and Greenstein and continuing
thereafter.
Furthermore, the results of deconcentration can be interpreted as a
switch from a so-called Chandlerian to a so-called Schumpeterian market
in terms of market leadership in innovative activities in ICT equipment.27
The Chandlerian view of market leadership focuses on the accumulative
nature of leadership, and asserts that market leadership persists for a long
time, embedded within the organizational form of leading firms. The
Schumpeterian “creative destruction” view states that market leadership
23. See Patent Explosion, supra note 13, at 15 (noting that electrical and computing technology
firms in the U.S. accounted for the higher rate in overall patenting between 1980 and 1989).
24. Bresnahan & Greenstein, supra note 3, at 1.
25. A platform in computing is a reconfigurable base of compatible components on which users
build applications. Interoperable standards typically play the role in making components
compatible and can be part of a larger strategy to govern how different groups interact with one
another. See Greenstein, supra note 5, at 497.
26. For example, there was considerable entry into the provision of components in the personal
computer (“PC”) platform commonly referred to as “IBM-compatible” PCs, and turnover in
leadership in many of its key components, such as word processing, spread sheet, and presentation
software. Yet, the competition “between” platforms—mainframe, minicomputer and PC—hardly
moved at all in response to changes “within” platforms. See Bresnahan & Greenstein, supra note
3, at 1 (emphasizing “the importance of technological competition between computer ‘platforms,’
not firms”).
27. Franco Malerba & Luigi Orsenigo, Schumpeterian Patterns of Innovation Are TechnologySpecific, 25 RES. POL’Y 451, 452 (1996). For a detailed discussion of Schumpeterian and
Chandlerian views of market leadership, and a benchmark for the transient and long time periods,
see John Sutton, Market Share Dynamics and the ‘Persistence of Leadership’ Debate, 97 AM.
ECON. REV. 222 (2007).
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is transient and subject to frequent threats of replacement. Malerba and
Orsenigo address this debate by identifying two classes of sectors. The
first class of sectors, the Schumpeter Mark II (Chandlerian) sectors, has
high concentration of innovative activities, big innovator size, high rank
stability among innovators, and low entry levels. These sectors include
chemicals and electronics firms. The second class of sectors, the
Schumpeter Mark I (Schumpeterian) sectors, has the opposite
characteristics, and includes mechanical technologies and traditional
sectors. This Study shows that the ownership of innovative activities was
highly concentrated in the early periods of the data, which is consistent
with Malerba and Orsenigo’s classification of electronics as a
Schumpeter Mark II industry.28 In addition, this Study further shows that
this high concentration of ownership has seen a dramatic change over the
last four decades, and, using Malerba’s and Orsenigo’s framework, may
be interpreted as a switch from a Chandlerian to a Schumpeterian market
structure.
The rest of this Study is organized as follows: Part I provides
background on the history of the ICT equipment industry, which
motivates a framework for analysis. Part II describes the data
construction, sample selection, and variable construction. Part III
presents the empirical methodology and deconcentration of patent
ownership results in ICT equipment. The Study concludes that the
evidence points towards a substantial reduction in concentration. The
Appendices contain details of data construction and data linking
methodology.
I. ICT EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION
How should deconcentration of innovation activity in the ICT
equipment industry from the late 1970s to the present be characterized?
ICT equipment plays an important role in markets for electronics,
computing, and infrastructure of radio, television, voice, and broadband
communication services. It would take several books to describe the
changes in market structure during this time, and this Part cannot hope to
review all the details.29 The purpose here is only to refresh the reader’s
memories about what the literature takes for granted about major changes
28. Malerba & Orsenigo, supra note 27, at 454.
29. The scale of change is too large to summarize in a short article. A comprehensive review
would involve a history of every leading firm (e.g., IBM, AT&T, and Motorola), a review of every
major change at the federal level in regulatory and antitrust policy, a review of an extraordinary
range of technical developments linked to the emergence of cellular telephony, packet-switching
(e.g., the Internet), and the personal computer, as well as miniaturization of digital technologies
(e.g., semi-conductors) and its consequences for a range of equipment markets.
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in the concentration of origins of inventive ideas in a wide set of related
industries. This will provide just enough of a brief overview to guide the
development of a framework for the statistical exercise.
A. Historical Overview
Prior to the 1980s, the ICT equipment industry consisted of various
segments, depending on whether it was oriented towards computing, as
it was then understood, or towards communications, namely, voice or
data.30 Both of these segments were highly concentrated in final goods
markets.31 At the end of the 1970s, IBM dominated the computing
segment with its mainframe systems and components built around those
systems.32 It also dominated the personal computer system market for a
short time, growing a small systems division that in 1984 would have
been the third largest computer company in the world (behind Digital
Equipment Corporation and IBM itself).33
Starting in the mid-1980s and accelerating thereafter, IBM lost market
share in personal computers and in many of the peripheral markets.34
After the introduction of the IBM personal computer (“PC”) in 1981, a
wide range of firms entered into printers, software, component
production, and local area networks.35 In the 1990s, Microsoft and Intel
began to assert control over an increasing fraction of valuable
components within the PC market; nonetheless, a large number of firms
played a role in many of its segments.36
30. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INNOVATION IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 19–20 (2003),
available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10795.html.
31. JAMES W. CORTADA, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AS BUSINESS HISTORY: ISSUES IN THE
HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF COMPUTERS 80 (1996).
32. Id. at 82, 169.
33. Id. at 177–78.
34. See WILLIAM APRAY & MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY, COMPUTER: A HISTORY OF THE
INFORMATION MACHINE 139 (1996) (“IBM enjoyed an exceptional dominance of computing for
at least two decades. But such dominance could not last forever, and it didn’t.”); Bresnahan &
Greenstein, supra note 3, at 26–27; Greenstein, supra note 5, at 514 (“At the outset of the 1990s,
before the Internet commercialized, IBM’s mainframe business had begun to decline significantly.
This led the board to remove the CEO and break with precedent by hiring a CEO from outside the
company . . . .”).
35. See Greenstein, supra note 5, at 499.
36. For more on platforms in computing markets and the ecosystems that grew up around them,
see, e.g., ANNABELLE GAWER & MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO, PLATFORM LEADERSHIP: HOW INTEL,
MICROSOFT AND CISCO DRIVE INNOVATION 15–16 (2002); ANDREW S. GROVE, ONLY THE
PARANOID SURVIVE: HOW TO EXPLOIT THE CRISIS POINTS THAT CHALLENGE EVERY COMPANY
AND CAREER 105–06 (1996). See generally DAVID G. MESSERSCHMITT & CLEMENS SZYPERSKI,
SOFTWARE ECOSYSTEM: UNDERSTANDING AN INDISPENSIBLE TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY
(2003) (describing the software industry as a complex ecosystem made up of numerous,
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Before the 1980s, AT&T was the dominant provider of networking
equipment in the voice segment, largely due to its regulated monopoly
position in telecommunication services; approximately 90% of AT&T’s
equipment purchases were supplied from its equipment subsidiary,
Western Electric. The voice segment was based on circuit-switching
technology and provided the infrastructure for local and long-distance
telephone companies.37 Furthermore, AT&T fought regulations that
ended its requirement that any equipment attached to its network had to
be supplied by AT&T, even on the end-user site.38 The purchase
behavior and network attachment requirement of AT&T restricted entry
into the telecommunications equipment markets, thus carrying AT&T’s
dominant position in telecom services into the telecom equipment
sector.39
These fights yielded change, but slowly. In 1968, AT&T lost an
antitrust suit against Carterfone Company, and was forced to permit
private interconnection equipment on the AT&T network.40 In 1975, the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) extended the Carterfone
decision to all private subscriber equipment that was registered to and
certified by the FCC.41 These decisions enabled entry into the
telecommunications equipment industry; as long as AT&T remained the
dominant purchaser of equipment, however, entry was limited.42 The
market structure changed further with the 1974 U.S. Department of
Justice antitrust suit against AT&T.43 The case was settled in 1982, with
AT&T divesting its local telephone service into seven independent,
regional holding companies, breaking up equipment purchasing decisionmaking. As a result, the telephone markets underwent considerable

complementary systems); U. VON BURG, THE TRIUMPH OF ETHERNET: TECHNOLOGICAL
COMMUNITIES AND THE BATTLE FOR THE LAN STANDARD (2001).
37. An introduction on this topic is provided in Ana Aizcorbe et al., The Role of Semiconductor
Inputs in IT Hardware Price Decline: Computers vs. Communications, in HARD-TO-MEASURE
GOODS AND SERVICES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ZVI GRILICHES. 351, 351–79 (Ernst R. Berndt &
Charles R. Hulten eds., 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0883.pdf.
38. For a discussion of these issues, see JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER,
DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 57–59
(2005); PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY IN PRICES AND POLITICS 85, 97,
99–112 (1987).
39. TEMIN, supra note 38, at 58.
40. In re The Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d
420, 422 (1968).
41. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.C.C.2d 1102, 1119–20 (1975).
42. Id.
43. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 38, at 60–64; TEMIN, supra note 38, at 104–12.
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changes in the early to mid-1990s.44
The data segment was based on packet-switching technology and
supplied the communication equipment required in the computing
industry, including modems and local area networks. Until the
emergence of the Ethernet standard, this segment was characterized by
proprietary protocols.45 Only with widespread use of the Ethernet
standard in the late 1980s and the Internet IP stack in the early 1990s did
non-proprietary standards begin to shape industry structure.46
The networking and Internet revolution of the 1990s blurred the
distinction between different segments of ICT equipment. This process
sometimes receives the label “convergence,” which means that
previously independent product market segments increasingly become
substitutes or complements in demand.47 On the computing side, systems
of PCs and workstations were initially connected with a local area
network (“LAN”). Over time, client-server systems within large
enterprises and across ownership boundaries were established. Novell,
3Com, Oracle, and Cisco were among the firms with dominant positions
in this era.48 With widespread Internet use, the scope of ambitions
became quite large, touching on virtually every economic activity in
which transmission of information played an important role.49 This
period was marked by economic experiments across a wide range of
activities that overlapped with applications of computing and
communications, as well as any related upstream or downstream activity.
It was marked by optimism and labeled “the dot-com bubble” in
recognition of the many startups that ended with the top-level domain
name “com.”50
In contrast, by the beginning of the millennium, many layers of the
industry had undergone upheaval.51 Some of this was associated with
44. See ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, TALK IS CHEAP: THE PROMISE OF
REGULATORY REFORM IN NORTH AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 5–7, 9–10 (1995)
(discussing the results of the phone monopoly break-up and the fragmentation that has resulted).
45. See VON BURG, supra note 36, at 3 (contrasting the development of Ethernet, an open
technological standard, to proprietary technology, over which the developer exerts exclusive
control).
46. See Greenstein, supra note 5, at 505–29.
47. Id.
48. See Bresnahan & Greenstein, supra note 3, at 29 (noting Novell’s and Oracle’s strength in
their respective markets).
49. See DALE W. JORGENSON ET AL., PRODUCTIVITY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE
AMERICAN GROWTH RESURGENCE (2003).
50. See generally Greenstein, supra note 5.
51. See Brent D. Goldfarb et al., Searching for Ghosts: Business Survival, Unmeasured
Entrepreneurial Activity and Private Equity Investment in the Dot-Com Era 2–3 (Robert H. Smith
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large, painful adjustments due to a decline in demand that was linked to
the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act52 and the
resulting growth and telecom meltdown. Some of it was due to the
bursting of the dot-com bubble.53 Eventually, the equipment market
stabilized, leaving Cisco in the dominant position in enterprise
computing to serve data communications. Yet other firms that grew
spectacularly during the 1990s, such as JDS Uniphase, Corning, Lucent,
Nortel, and 3Com, did not fare as well.
This brief review suggests several of the core questions that motivate
the statistical work of this Study. First, is the evidence consistent with
the common presumption that there has been a deconcentration in the
ownership of innovative ideas? Second, can this deconcentration be
explained by something straightforward, such as the divestiture of
AT&T, the loss of commercial leadership at IBM or Motorola, or any
other large industry firm? Third, what role do other factors play, such as
firm entry, particularly non-U.S. firm entry, which has accelerated over
this period? And fourth, has the externalization of R&D by established
firms merely changed the structure of the origins of innovation, but not
its concentration as it relates to final output markets?
B. Theoretical Framework
This Section provides a brief overview of the framework of this Study.
It fixes, introduces, and establishes a few key ideas, and provides a
roadmap for later developments.
Following prior literature,54 this Study divides the industry into an
upstream sector that supplies invention and a downstream sector that
supplies products. The inventions can take a variety of forms, such as
implemented ideas in prototype products or patent filings or copyrighted
designs. The downstream sector employs inventions from the upstream
sector in production.
The literature on the rise of DTL focuses on the increasing infrequency
of situations where one firm has a monopoly over an idea.55 In practice,
these ideas come from very specific classes of technologies and map into
very specific product markets, such as specific component markets or

Sch. of Bus., Paper No. RHS-06-027, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
825687 (providing an extensive discussion of examples).
52. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat 56 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
53. Goldfarb et al., supra note 51, at 6–7.
54. ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION
AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 6 (2001); Gans et al., supra note 6, at 583.
55. See, e.g., Bresnahan & Greenstein, supra note 3, at 3–5 (discussing DTL).
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software applications. The literature stresses that such monopolies are
less likely to arise where many technical substitutes can emerge—for
example, as when multiple firms can supply a microprocessor to perform
basic memory functions. Substitutes are more likely to emerge in settings
where many potential inventors generate similar ideas, and where entry
into production of ideas is less costly. The latter situation characterized
many consumer equipment markets, such as cameras, televisions, and
video players. It also characterized many software markets for personal
computers in the 1980s and 1990s, and, later, many Internet application
markets in the late 1990s and beyond.
There are many alternative ways of measuring settings where many
potential inventors generate similar ideas. For reasons explained below,
this Study settled on a top-twenty-five concentration ratio over the
ownership of inventive ideas, which is labeled as C25, in technological
class, which is indexed by i. Illustrating the concept, a technological
class i is said to be more concentrated if the largest twenty-five firms own
80% of the inventive ideas instead of, say, 50% of the ideas in that
technology class.
The literature discussed many related measures of concentration for a
sector, and these are book-ended by two concepts: one related to the flow
of new ideas, and another related to the stock of ideas. The existing
literature on DTL suggests the flow of ideas is relevant for fostering entry
into product markets, for example, while the stock of ideas is relevant for
new combinations of technologies fostering entry or industrial change.
This Study focuses on the flow of ideas concept, as this is the first step
towards implementing these concepts. The latter is left for later work.
The first key question concerns changes in concentration of ownership
over time: Is the evidence consistent with decreasing concentration over
time? When looking at a concentration ratio, for example, that will focus
on the question for each technical sector, labeled i, namely:
(𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 )𝑖𝑡 − (𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 )𝑖𝑡−1 < 0 .
Generally, as discussed below, a wide range of technology classes did
become more deconcentrated. That motivated the second question,
concerning the causes of changes in concentration over time. In general,
this approach will identify causes of the variance in changes of
concentration between different technology classes. That is, this Study
posits:

(𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 )𝑖𝑡 − (𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 )

𝑖𝑡−1

= 𝑓(𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑖, 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑖).
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The literature on DTL frames the open question: what factors caused
changes in concentration? As the review of the history discussed above
suggests,56 important supply-side factors include the decline of dominant
firms, increasing economies of scope across technology sectors, the entry
of foreign firms, and the entry of small firms. Important demand-side
factors include the increasing use of mergers by leading firms to obtain
invention from external sources, increasing acceptance of technical
products from unbranded firms by users, and the increasing use of open
standards that permit customers to buy interoperable products from more
than one supplier. This Study will construct measures for all three supply
factors, while the demand factors will be absorbed into time trends, for
reasons described below.
II. DATA
Patents are one of the most utilized sources of information in the
innovation literature.57 The use of patent data as a proxy for economic
activity dates back to Schmookler and Griliches, and since then, an
extensive literature on using patents as indicators of innovative activity
has developed.58 This Study keeps with this literature and focuses on
patents granted in the ICT equipment industry as a proxy for the origins
of innovative activity.59 Since pursuing questions related to DTL led us
to modify the practices underlying existing, widely-used patent datasets,
we first explain our overlap with and departures from the existing
literature.60 We then establish changes in the level of ownership
composition of new innovative activity, and then link these changes to

56. See supra Part I.A.
57. See, e.g., Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1661, 1661–62 (1990) (discussing the benefits of studying patents, including their
availability and objectivity); Sadao Nagaoka et al., Patent Statistics as an Innovation Indicator, in
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION, supra note 5, at 1085, 1085–86 (discussing the
basic characteristics of patent data as an innovation indicator).
58. See Griliches, supra note 57, at 1662–63; Nagaoka et al., supra note 57, at 1085–86
(“Recently, patent information is increasingly used to analyze innovation and the innovation
process, and patent statistics are increasingly used as a measure of innovation.”); Jacob
Schmookler, Invention and Economic Development (1951) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania) (on file with author).
59. Using patenting to measure invention has one principal advantage: it provides a
standardized measure over a very long time period. There is, as yet, no other feasible way to
measure the extent and direction of inventive activity over four decades across a set of related
technical segments, as done in this Study.
60. See infra Part II.A.
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underlying supply-side factors, which include new entry, lateral entry (a
firm’s economies of scope), and growth.61
The standard source for patent data in the innovation literature has
been the NBER patent data file.62 In contrast, we used raw USPTO files
to construct an updated patent data file. Appendix I describes the
construction of patent data from 1976 to 2010.
A. Patent Sample Selection
The ICT equipment industry is a knowledge-intensive market that
corresponds to hundreds of billions of dollars in investments by end users
in the downstream, and roughly 14% of U.S. patent stock in the upstream.
We identify the ICT equipment industry in the patent data by extracting
forty-four patent technology classes from the newly constructed USPTO
patent data: fourteen technology classes identified as communications by
Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg;63 twenty-two technology classes in the 700
ranges; and eight classes identified as relevant to telecommunications in
the USPTO communications report. We then drop fourteen classes due
to sparse patenting activity.64 The classification variable is taken from
the December 2010 version of the U.S. Patent Grant Master
Classification File (“MCF”)65 published by the USPTO.66
While our patent data include granted patents between 1976 and 2010,
we encounter truncation created by the application-grant lag in the patent
system.67 Accordingly, we restrict our sample to patents applied for
between 1976 and 2007. The final dataset has 550,884 patents with

61. See infra Part II.B.
62. See Griliches, supra note 57, at 1662 (discussing studies); Nagaoka et al., supra note 57, at
1112–17 (same).
63. Data File, supra note 9, at 41.
64. Appendix III contains lists of all considered classes. The focus of this Study is the ICTE
Industry, and these forty-four classes are identified as parts of ICTE in widely accepted USPTO
classifications and NBER patent data classifications. The dropped classes correspond to roughly
10% of the entire patenting in ICTE.
65. The latest version of the MFC can be found at https://explore.data.gov/BusinessEnterprise/Master-Classification-File-MCF-Patent-Grant-Patent/vg9q-x87u.
66. The USPTO organizes patents into approximately 450 technology classes, and 150,000
subclasses, based on common subject matter, in which a class delineates one technology from
another. For more information on the USPTO classification system, see OFFICE OF PATENT
CLASSIFICATION, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/classification/index.jsp (last visited
Oct. 31, 2013).
67. Some patents applications in 2005 and 2006, for example, had not yet been granted as of
2010, and, therefore, we could not examine them. The phenomenon became more severe as we
approached 2010.
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primary technology classes in the thirty ICT equipment classes, assigned
to 38,359 unique assignees.
The 550,000 patents granted in the ICT equipment industry during our
sample period correspond to roughly 14% of all patenting activity in the
United States. Figure 1 provides a breakdown of granted patents over the
years. As observed, the number of patents granted in ICT equipment
follows a trend akin to the total number of utility patents granted by the
USPTO: the number of patents granted increases starting in the 1980s,
followed by a sharp decline in the 2000s due to the patent grant delay—
the time between the patent application by inventors and their receipt of
a grant from the USPTO. The figure also provides the relative magnitude
of unassigned patents, roughly 30,000, which we drop from our sample,
as we are interested in analyzing the assigned patents.68 Given the small
magnitude, it is unlikely that the unassigned patents drive any of our
results.69
The patent literature firmly establishes that patent values are highly
skewed, with studies noting that the most valuable 10% of patents
account for as much as 80% of total value of patents.70 Below we provide
results for all patents, and then for patents that receive the bulk of
citations, which are presumed to be of higher quality,71 and, relatedly, the

68. The dropped, unassigned patents are held by independent inventors. An independent
inventor is defined by the USPTO as “a person whose patent, at the time of grant, has ownership
that is unassigned or assigned to an individual (i.e., ownership of the patent is not assigned to an
organization).” USPTO Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, Independent Inventors By State By Year
All Patent Types Report, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/inv_all.htm (last modified April 2, 2013).
69. Unassigned patents belong to independent inventors, and calculating ownership
concentration in independent inventors involves identifying unique inventors in the patent data in
a similar method to our firm name-linking algorithm described in the Appendices. Therefore, the
unassigned patents are dropped from our sample. It is unlikely that any independent inventor would
have enough patents to be among the top twenty-five firms, and therefore this drop impacts our
concentration measure described in Part II.B infra only at the denominator. Given the small size
of the unassigned patents, and their disbursement across technology classes, including them in the
data would simply pull down our concentration measure by a negligible amount.
70. See, e.g., F. M. Scherer & Dietmar Harhoff, Technology Policy for a World of SkewDistributed Outcomes, 29 RES. POL’Y 559, 559 (2000). For other studies stressing the skewed
distribution of patent values, see Dietmar Harhoff et al., Citation Frequency and the Value of
Patented Inventions, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 511 (1999); Ariel Pakes & Mark Schankerman, The
Rate of Obsolescence of Patents, Research Gestation Lags, and the Private Rate of Return to
Research Resources, in R&D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 73 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984).
71. An interpretation of this approach is through the Schumpeterian framework. See JOSEF
SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Redvers Opie trans., 1934)
(distinguishing inventions and innovations: an invention is a potential innovation, and becomes an
innovation only when it is commercialized). One could argue that the count of all patents is a better
proxy for inventions and the count of high-quality patents is a better proxy for innovations. See
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most valuable.72 We define high-quality patents as the top quartile within
their technology class-year group cells in terms of citations received.73
B. Concentration and Other Measures
This Section describes the market structure and technology supply
proxies we use in our empirical framework. Table 3 provides a summary
of these variables.
Our main variable is the patent ownership concentration in a
technology class. We capture the ownership concentration of granted
patents in each technology class-year group as the share of top firms in
the ICT equipment industry. More specifically we create variables
𝐶1𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 , 𝐶2𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 , . . ., 𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 , where 𝐶𝑋𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 is the share of patents by the
top X firms within the technology class-year group. In each year group
we reselect the top firms; in other words, even though the number of
firms used to calculate CX is kept constant at X, the set of firms may be
different from period to period. We stop at 𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 because in many of
the technology class-year groups, the top twenty-five firms reach 100%
ownership in the early years of our sample. Table 3 reports that on
average the top twenty-five firms in a technology class-year group own
60% of patents. Though, as discussed in the next Section, there is
considerable variation in this concentration over time.74
Firm entry into innovative activities provides one theory on
deconcentration.75 In an effort to capture the impact of firm entry, we
have three classes of entry variables. In the first class, patent-weighted
entry level is constructed by two measures of entry based on the previous
patenting activity of the firm, which we label as new entry and lateral
entry, and which we define below. Firm i is considered a new entrant to
technology class j in period t if the firm does not have any patents in any
of the ICT equipment classes prior to period t, and has at least one patent

Joel West & Marcel Bogers, Profiting from External Innovation: A Review of Research on Open
Innovation 26 (September 13, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1949520 (discussing patents as a measure of innovation); see also Ricardo
J. Caballero & Adam B.A. Jaffe, How High Are the Giants' Shoulders: An Empirical Assessment
of Knowledge Spillovers and Creative Destruction in a Model of Economic Growth 7 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4370, 1993) (offering another alternative interpretation
“that patents are proportional to ideas, and that citations are proportional to ideas used”).
72. See, e.g., Harhoff et al., supra note 70, at 511 (discussing the value of citations); Hall et al.,
supra note 20, at 24, 31–34 (finding a significant relation between the value of patents and the
number of citations they receive).
73. We have also examined the top decile without any large change in inference.
74. See infra Part III.A.
75. Kortum & Lerner, supra note 17, at 1–22.
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in technology class j in period t. When such an entry occurs, we consider
all patents of firm i in period t in technology class j to be patents by a
new entrant, and calculate the new entry share by dividing the total
number of new entry patents by the total number of patents in technology
class j in period t. The new entry variable then captures the level of
transaction costs of entry into the supply of ideas, particularly from those
who previously had made none, where the transactions costs of entry
would matter most for outcomes. When we restrict the variable to
account for only foreign entry, we then capture the transaction costs of
entry by non-U.S. firms. Table 3 suggests that firms that had no prior
ICT equipment innovation activity produce, on average, 12% of patents
in a technology class. This share increases to 19% when the sample is
restricted to high-quality patents.76
In addition to firms entering into the ICT equipment industry from
outside, firms may also be active in one ICT equipment class and later
move to a new ICT equipment class. We consider such firms as lateral
entrants. More specifically, we consider firm i a lateral entrant to
technology class j in period t if the firm did not have any patents in
technology class j prior to period t, had at least one patent in another ICT
equipment technology class prior to period t, and had at least one patent
in class j in period t. We then calculate the lateral entry share as the ratio
of patents by lateral entrants in period t in class j to the total patent count
in period t in class j. We theorize that a higher lateral entry level implies
higher economies of scope across different technology classes. The
summary statistics in Table 3 reveal that on average, 11% of patents come
from lateral entrants, with the share going up to 15% for high-quality
patents.
The two entry variables, new entry share and lateral entry share, proxy
for patent-count weighted entry into a technology. We should note that
when combined, these two variables capture the inverse of the serial
dependence of patenting by firms already in a technology class. In other
words, considering the 11% new entry and 12% lateral entry averages,
we deduce that on average, 77% (100–11–12) of patents come from firms
that already had patents in a technology class in prior periods. As a result,
when we include both entry variables in the model, we also account for
the serial dependence.77
76. When we restrict the sample to high-quality patents, the entry variables capture entry into
the high-quality patent pool rather than entry into the entire patent pool. In other words, a firm
with many low-quality patents and no high-quality patent in prior periods would be considered an
entrant in the first period it produces a high-quality patent.
77. Serial dependence (or serial correlation) is the dependence of the value of a variable in a
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The second class of entry variables is the growth in the number of
firms active in a technology class. Using simple firm counts, we
calculate the growth in the number of firms over time. We see that on
average the number of firms has increased by 13% every two years, with
firms located outside the U.S. having a relatively higher growth rate of
17%.78 As an overwhelming majority of the firms in the sample are U.S.based, the total growth in the number of firms is very close to the growth
in U.S.-firms, which is around 13%.
The growth in the number of issued patents constitutes our third class
of independent variables. We see that on average the patent count has
grown by 19% every two years (18% in domestic and 26% in foreign
firms). When we take into account the 13% average increase in the
number of firms over two-year periods, which is considerably less than
the 19% growth in patent count, we deduce that patent growth is coming
from both entrants and incumbents.
The final class of control variables in our model consists of proxies for
increase or decrease in product market leadership: dummies for the
presence of a big firm. As the history of this sector suggests, the
breakdown of AT&T might have been responsible for the
deconcentration in patent ownership, and that conjecture calls for these
statistical controls. In an attempt to discern whether the existence of big
firms, namely AT&T, Motorola, and IBM, has an impact on the
concentration, we include lagged indicators for their existence among the
top five patent applicants. We see that the presence of AT&T is
somewhat dwarfed by the strong presence of IBM: IBM is among the top
five patent applicants in 41% of technology class-year group cells,
whereas AT&T and Motorola are in the top five patent applicants in only
37% and 25% of the cells, respectively.79

time on the value of the same variable at another time. For more information, see generally
WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (4th ed. 2000).
78. One should take the statements about foreign firms with a grain of salt for the following
reason. The foreign indicator in the patent data captures the location of a firm, but not its origin or
ultimate ownership. For example, even though practitioners would consider Sony Electronics Inc.
a non-U.S. firm, in the patent data it is located at Park Ridge, New Jersey, and therefore is
considered to be a U.S. firm (e.g., USPTO patent 5,828,956).
79. These cells correspond to two-year periods as opposed to one year. This construct is
explained infra in Part III.A.
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III. DECONCENTRATION OF PATENT OWNERSHIP
A. Composition of Ownership in New Patents: Historical Trends
This Section describes long-term trends, which characterizes our
endogenous variable. We construct a measure of concentration, and then
analyze the new patent creation across the thirty ICT equipment
technology classes. To capture the dynamics of new patent creation, we
calculate the patent flow variable—the number of new patents a firm has
applied for in a given year and was granted at a later date.80
Patent applications do not get approved with any regularity, however,
and sheer randomness can lead to little activity in some technical classes
for extended periods of time. To ensure that we have enough observation
in each bucket (i.e., each patent class each period) in our analyses of
patent flow, we use two-year intervals as the measure of time instead of
individual years. Therefore, the observation level throughout the patent
flow analyses is a technology class-year group.
We use 𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 , the share of top twenty-five firms in new patents, as
our measure of concentration. In calculating the 𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 measure, we
reselect the top firms in each period.81 We choose 𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 as opposed
to other 𝐶𝑋𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 values because in many cells, 𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 reaches to 100%
for the early periods of our sample. We discuss the choice of the
concentration measure further in Part III.B.82
Figure 2 illustrates the 𝐶𝑋𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 values for technology class 385 (Optical
Waveguides). The top line in Figure 2 represents the share of top twentyfive firms in the class (𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 ), and the bottom line represents the share
of the top firm only (𝐶1𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 ). The share of the top twenty-five firms has
seen a decline from around 70% in 1976–77 to around 41% in 2006–07.
In fact, we observe a similar trend in twenty-six of the thirty classes in
our sample. In only four classes the values of 𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 fluctuate. All
these trends suggest a deconcentration of ownership in new patents in our
sample period.

80. The patent grants may come many years after a patent is applied for, and this delay is coined
as the patent application-grant delay. The convention in the literature on patents is to use the patent
application year as the year of the innovation/invention because the application year is closer to the
actual creation of the idea; whereas the delay, hence the grant year, is a function of other factors
including the workload and staffing issues at the USPTO. In this Study, we follow this convention,
and use the patents applied for and granted between 1976 and 2010.
81. To be clear, the measure is based on twenty-five firms in each period, even if there are
changes in the identities of these firms from period to period.
82. See infra Part III.B.
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We now turn to Table 1 to observe this deconcentration trend across
all technology classes. Table 1–A shows the distribution of 𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤
values across all technology classes for all assigned patents in the ICT
equipment sample. The mean value of the top twenty-five firms’ new
patent share across technology classes follows a gradual decline over the
years from 72% in the 1976–77 period to 55% in 2006–07. When the
sample is restricted to the high-quality patents—the top 25% of patents
within each class-year group based on citations received—we observe an
even sharper reduction in concentration from 86% in 1976–77 to 62% in
2006–07.83
Figure 3 is simply an alternative way of observing this trend of
deconcentration: in 1976–77, five classes possessed more than 90% of
the new patents, whereas in 2006–07 no classes showed such
concentrated ownership at the top. The difference is even starker for
high-quality patents: when we restrict the sample to the top 25% of
patents, the top twenty-five firms in 1976–77 possessed more than 90%
of the new patents in ten classes, as opposed to only one class in 2006–
07.84
We now do our first investigation of the potential causes of this
deconcentration across technology classes. Did the divestiture of AT&T
in 1982 play a role? To see if this claim holds in a first pass through the
data, we calculate a simple statistic, the number of firms that contribute
90% or more of the changes in 𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 , the share of top twenty-five
firms, over our sample period. The results are presented in Table 2: Panel
A reports the changes for all ICT equipment patents, and Panel B reports
the same analyses for high-quality patents. We see that of the twenty-six
classes with deconcentration, in only two classes are three or fewer firms
responsible for 90% or more of the reduction in 𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 . In the
remaining twenty-four classes, there is an industry-wide deconcentration
trend, which suggests that the breakdown of AT&T, or another leading
firm, cannot be the sole reason for the established deconcentration. The
qualitative observations remain the same when we restrict the sample to
high-quality patents.

83. Similar results hold when we restrict the sample further to include only the highest-quality
patents, those in the top 10%: the average value drops from 96% in 1976–77 to 71% in 2006–07.
84. Similar results hold for the top 10% of the patents, with twenty-four classes in 1976–77 and
six classes in 2006–07.
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B. Composition of Ownership in New Patents: The Model
Part III.A presented historical trends and provided evidence for a
deconcentration trend in the ownership of new patents in the ICT
equipment industry.85 This Section combines these historical trends into
a single fixed effects model to provide a coherent framework of the
potential causes of the established deconcentration. In this analysis,
𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 , the share of top twenty-five firms is the dependent variable.
The basic model is as follows:
(𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 )𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1 * (New Entry)𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2 * (Lateral Entry)𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽3 * (Growth)𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽4 * 𝛿𝑗,𝑡−1,𝐴𝑇&𝑇
+ 𝛽5 * 𝛿𝑗,𝑡−1,,𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑎 + 𝛽6 * 𝛿𝑗,𝑡−1,𝐼𝐵𝑀 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 ,
Here, j is the technology class indicator and t is the time indicator. The
list of regressors include new entry and lateral entry into technology
classes, growth measures, and indicator variables for the presence of big
firms, namely AT&T, Motorola, and IBM.86 We use two sets of growth
measures: one for growth in the number of firms, and a second for growth
in the number of patents. We further divide these growth variables into
two components: growth in U.S.-based firms and patents, and their
foreign counterparts. The growth measures are highly correlated (the
Pearson correlation between total firm growth and total patent growth is
0.83).87 Therefore, we use either the firm-based or the patent-based
measure in a single model.
We present the results of the fixed effects models in Table 4, Panel A.
The dependent variable in the model is 𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 , the share of the top
twenty-five firms in new patents. All models include class fixed effects;
models 1–4 include a linear and a quadratic time trend, whereas models
5–8 include time fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by
technology-class. The columns differ in the inclusion of different patent
growth and number of firm growth variables.

85. See supra Part III.A.
86. The construction and summary statistics of these variables are provided supra in Part II.B
and infra at Table 3.
87. The Pearson correlation is a measure of linear correlation between two variables, and gives
values between -1 and 1. A Pearson correlation of zero indicates that the two variables are not
linearly dependent, and as the correlation moves away from zero in either direction, the linear
dependence between the variables increases. Furthermore, a positive Pearson correlation value
indicates that as one variable increases so does the other, and a negative correlation implies that as
the value of one variable increases the other decreases.
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The main qualitative results seem to hold across all models, and here
we provide illustrations using the results from column 1. Growth in the
number of firms is one of the main drivers of deconcentration. The Table
shows that a 1% growth in the number of firms results in a decrease of
5.8% in the ownership share of top twenty-five firms. This is large. A
technology class at the average firm growth rate of 13% every two years
faces a reduction of approximately 0.8% (which equals 5.87% * 0.13) in
the share of top twenty-five firms in two years, even after controlling for
individual class effects and time trend.88 When we break the growth
variable into U.S.-based growth and foreign growth, we observe that
contrary to conventional wisdom, only the U.S.-based growth is a driving
force of deconcentration, and the foreign growth does not have a
statistically or economically significant impact on our concentration
measures.
Neither new entry share nor growth in the number of patents, however,
seems to have a statistically significant impact at the 90% confidence
level, though the sign of the estimates are in the negative direction, as
expected. The lateral entry is associated with an increase in the
ownership of top firms, and the impact is both statistically and
economically significant: a technology class experiencing the average
level lateral entry, 11% per period, faces a 3.5% (which equals 30.37% *
0.11) increase in 𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 . This result may be driven by the fact that
firms conducting lateral entry operate in multiple segments of the
industry, and hence are expected to have a bigger operation than others.89
Finally, the models suggest that the existence of AT&T as one of the
top five patent owners in the prior period does not have a statistically
significant impact on the concentration of the patent class, which is
consistent with the earlier trend analyses. The coefficient of the IBM
indicator is also not significant. The presence of Motorola as a prior topfive patent applicant, however, is associated with an approximately 1.5%
increase in the ownership concentration of the patent class over two
years. A detailed look at Motorola’s activity reveals that it focuses on
five technology classes in which the deconcentration is less than the
average across all technology classes. It is unclear whether the increased
concentration is driven by the presence of Motorola or whether it is

88. This result is consistent with the fertile technology hypotheses of Kortum and Lerner. See
Kortum & Lerner, supra note 17.
89. An alternative explanation may be that the lateral entrants move from large technology
classes to small technology classes, hence dominating the class they move into. A breakdown of
patent counts by technology class indicates that no single technology class in our data sample
dominates, hence we refute this alternative explanation.
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simply an artifact of selection on technology classes in which Motorola
used to provide equipment.
The econometric results across all models show that growth in the
number of firms is an important driver of deconcentration, suggesting
that a smaller transaction cost for entry results in lower ownership
concentration. Lateral entry works in the opposite direction of entry by
increasing the concentration of patent ownership. There are similar
results for the growth of high-quality patents in the number of firms; the
impact of lateral entry, however, is mitigated and also loses its statistical
significance in some of the models (Panel B of Table 4).90 Note that
lateral entry in this context means having a high-quality patent in one ICT
equipment class, and producing a new high-quality patent in another ICT
equipment class in which the firm did not have high-quality patents
previously; having low-quality patents in either industry has no effect on
the entry measure among high-quality patents.
These findings also raise an interesting open question. Looking at how
the new entry and lateral entry vary over time (averaged across
technology classes), we observe a declining trend in both. The new entry
share starts around 15% in 1978–79 and gradually drops to 6.4% in 2006–
07. The lateral entry share follows a similar declining trend, with 21%
in 1978–79, and 6.1% in 2006–07. It is possible that the factors of lateral
entry and new entry only reflected a one-time change that has largely
played itself out. If both have declined permanently, then neither factor
can play as large a role in driving change going forward.
CONCLUSION
This Study characterizes long-term trends related to the concentration
of the origins of inventive ideas in the ICT equipment industry.
Analyzing the concentration in granted patents in this industry from 1976
to 2010, this Study compares measured changes against popular
assumptions about the size and scale of changes in innovation.
Overall, this Study reveals a substantial decline in concentration. The
data show that the deconcentration trend is present in the ownership of
new patents and that the size and scope of the changes vary considerably,
with some segments of ICT equipment undergoing much more dramatic
changes in concentration.

90. In unreported results, these changes are even more pronounced when we restrict the patents
to the top 10%: lateral entry is no longer statistically significant in any of the models, though the
total growth in the number of firms is still of the same magnitude and is statistically significant.
The results also hold qualitatively.

OZCAN AND GREENSTEIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/6/2013 12:52 PM

2013] Composition of Innovative Activity in ICT Equipment R&D

503

This Study also provides evidence about the causes of this change.
The statistical evidence is consistent with explanations that stress the role
of supply-side changes. This Study presents evidence that firm entry
accounts for part of this deconcentration. Importantly, this Study rejects
the notion that non-U.S.-firm entry caused the change, and the notion that
one antitrust case, one company’s strategic error, or the break-up of one
large leading innovator accounts for this change in structure.
The results of this Study motivate open questions for future research.
Firstly, this Study has examined changes in the ownership concentration
of new patents. Patents, however, are valid for seventeen to twenty years,
and many lose their relevance quickly. It is imperative to investigate how
the changes in the flow of patents impact the long term changes in the
stock of patents, and patents that are granted not only in the year of the
flow, but also during the previous twenty years.
Furthermore, this Study uses proxies from the supply side of the
upstream innovation markets, and does not explicitly model the demand
for innovation. The demand for innovation, such as acquisition of startup
firms by incumbents, or increasing product market demand, may also be
playing a role in the observed long-term trends of deconcentration. For
example, does the demand for acquisition of startup (i.e., the market for
ideas) undo the deconcentration of ownership? This is possible by
transferring the innovation stock from entrants to incumbents. It is one
of the key open questions motivated by this first look at the long-term
history.
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Table 1: Distribution of 𝑪𝟐𝟓𝒇𝒍𝒐𝒘 Values
Panel A: All ICT Equipment Patents
St.
Mean
Dev.
10%
25%
50%
75%
(%)
(%)

90%

76–77
72
17
53
62
70
86
100
78–79
72
17
52
62
67
85
98
80–81
72
16
53
63
72
82
90
82–83
69
16
51
61
68
76
94
84–85
64
14
48
56
62
72
83
86–87
62
13
45
55
63
70
80
88–89
60
13
45
53
63
68
76
90–91
61
12
46
53
62
69
76
92–93
60
12
40
54
61
68
74
94–95
58
12
35
54
61
66
71
96–97
58
12
36
53
60
65
71
98–99
56
12
36
50
58
62
71
00–01
53
12
35
45
55
59
66
02–03
53
12
37
46
55
59
65
04–05
54
13
38
49
53
61
73
06–07
55
13
37
49
55
63
71
Notes: Evolution of the patent application flow share for top twenty-five
firms that are ultimately granted on or before 2010. Each row
corresponds to a two-year time period. The sample includes patent
applications from thirty patent technology classes in the ICT equipment
industry, at all levels of patent quality.
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Table 1: Distribution of 𝑪𝟐𝟓𝒇𝒍𝒐𝒘 Values
Panel B: Top 25% of ICT Equipment Patents
St.
Mean
Dev.
10%
25%
50%
75%
(%)
(%)
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90%

76–77
86
15
66
77
88
100
100
78–79
83
16
65
72
80
100
100
80–81
81
16
63
71
80
100
100
82–83
80
17
59
68
75
100
100
84–85
77
19
51
67
72
100
100
86–87
73
18
49
63
71
84
100
88–89
71
16
51
60
68
81
100
90–91
70
15
52
61
68
77
91
92–93
67
13
49
60
66
74
82
94–95
62
11
43
60
65
70
73
96–97
60
12
43
53
60
69
74
98–99
58
11
38
53
61
66
71
00–01
56
12
35
50
57
62
72
02–03
55
13
36
48
56
60
72
04–05
59
13
41
53
59
66
77
06–07
62
14
46%
53%
60%
73%
82%
Notes: Evolution of the patent application flow share for top twenty-five
firms that are ultimately granted on or before 2010. Each row
corresponds to a two-year time period. The sample includes patent
applications from thirty patent technology classes in the ICT equipment
industry, and the highest quartile of patents, where quality is measured
by citations received.
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Table 2: No. of Companies Accounting for 90% of Change in
𝑪𝟐𝟓𝒇𝒍𝒐𝒘
Panel A: All ICT Equipment Patents
No. of
No. of
Companies Classes
1–3
2
4–19
14
20–24
10
Total
26
Notes: The number of ICT equipment industry patent technology classes
that went through a deconcentration of patent flow ownership from 1976
to 2007, grouped by the number of companies that account for the 90%
of the deconcentration. The sample includes all levels of patent quality.
Panel B: Top 25% of ICT Equipment Patents
No. of
No. of
Companies Classes
1–3
3
4–19
13
20–24
11
Total
27
Notes: The number of ICT equipment industry patent technology classes
that went through a deconcentration of patent flow ownership from 1976
to 2007, grouped by the number of companies that account for the 90%
of the deconcentration. The sample includes the highest quartile of
patents, where quality is measured by citations received.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Key Patent Flow Variables
Std.
Mean
Dev.
Variable
(%)
(%)
𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤
60
14
New Entry Share
12
8
Lateral Entry Share
11
7
Growth in No. of Firms
Total
13
25
US only
13
27
Foreign only
17
54
Growth in No. of Patents
Total
19
35
US only
18
37
Foreign only
26
81
Firm in Top 5 in Previous Period
AT&T
0.37
0.48
Motorola
0.25
0.43
IBM
0.41
0.49
Notes: The sample includes patent applications from all levels of quality
in the period 1976 to 2007 that are ultimately granted by the USPTO on
or before 2010. The averages are across the thirty ICT equipment
industry patent technology classes, and two-year time period cells.
C25flow is the patent application share of top twenty-five companies
within a cell. New Entry Share is the share of patents in a technology
class in a period that are held by assignees that did not have any patents
in any ICT equipment industry patent technology classes in prior periods.
Lateral Entry Share is the share of patents in a technology class in a
period that are held by assignees that had patents in other ICT equipment
industry patent technology classes in prior periods, but did not have any
patents in the current technology class in an earlier period. Growth is
measured within each technology class across two consecutive two-year
periods. The firm dummies indicate the presence of the firm among the
top five patent flow holders in the previous two-year period.
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Table 4: OLS Analysis of Patent Flow Ownership Concentration
Panel A: All ICT Equipment Patents
Dependent Variable:

𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤
New Entry Share
Lateral Entry
Share
Total Growth in
No. of Firms

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-28.29
(34.95)

-29.66
(35.41)

-34.76
(34.88)

-34.95
(35.01)

-20.74
(35.74)

-22.59
(36.32)

-29.23
(35.90)

-29.58
(36.11)

30.37
(12.03)
**

29.52
(12.52)
**

25.41
(12.74)
*

24.83
(13.13)
*

35.71
(12.69)
***

34.9
(13.45)
**

29.46
(13.51)
**

29.22
(14.26)
**

-5.87
(1.95)
***

-7.87
(2.37)
***

US only

-4.57
(1.57)
***

-5.98
(1.86)
***

Foreign only

-0.16
(0.32)

-0.34
(0.36)

Total Growth in
No. of Patents

-0.69
(1.12)

-1.39
(1.44)

US only

-0.28
(0.83)

-0.97
(1.04)

Foreign only

0.02
(0.2)

-0.03
(0.26)

Lagged Dummies
if Firm Is in Top 5
AT&T

-1.43
(0.95)

-1.26
(0.96)

-1.06
(0.95)

-1.01
(0.94)

-1.83
(0.97)
*

-1.63
(0.97)

-1.31
(0.94)

-1.28
(0.94)

Motorola

1.55
(0.83)
*

1.52
(0.84)
*

1.52
(0.83)
*

1.5
(0.83)
*

0.74
(0.74)

0.75
(0.77)

0.9
(0.75)

0.9
(0.76)

IBM

-0.02
(1.15)

-0.16
(1.14)

-0.28
(1.06)

-0.34
(1.07)

-0.17
(1.31)

-0.31
(1.3)

-0.32
(1.2)

-0.37
(1.2)

Time Trend

-1.76
(0.60)
***

-1.82
(0.60)
***

-2.27
(0.66)
***

-2.33
(0.68)
***

Time Trend Sq.

0.03
(0.03)

0.03
(0.03)

0.06
(0.03)
*

0.06
(0.03)
*

Intercept

73.17
(6.82)
***

73.38
(6.84)
***

75.19
(6.56)
***

75.32
(6.64)
***

68.18
(7.90)
***

68.39
(8.02)
***

70.36
(7.68)
***

70.39
(7.78)
***

-

-

-

-

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

57%

56%

55%

55%

59%

58%

56%

56%

Time Fixed Effects
R-Squared
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Notes: Regressions are ordinary least squares, with S.E. in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively. Standard errors are clustered by class. An observation is a
patent technology class and a two-year time period. N is 450. Each
model includes technology class fixed effects. Models 1-4 include a
linear and a quadratic time trend; models 5-8 include time fixed effects.
The sample includes patent applications from all levels of quality in the
period 1976 to 2007 that are ultimately granted by the USPTO on or
before 2010.

OZCAN AND GREENSTEIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

510

12/6/2013 12:52 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 45

Table 4: OLS Analysis of Patent Flow Ownership Concentration
Panel B: Top 25% of ICT Equipment Patents
Dependent Variable:

𝐶25𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

New Entry Share

-1.45
(12.51)

0.89
(12.87)

-9.09
(13.4)

-7.59
(13.62)

-1.63
(11.72)

1.65
(12.2)

-8.62
(12.27)

-5.95
(12.71)

Lateral Entry Share

18.93
(9.77)
*

20.28
(9.30)
**

13.66
(9.74)

15.45
(9.3)

22.74
(9.95)
**

24.94
(9.30)
**

17.65
(9.77)
*

20.32
(9.19)
**

Total Growth in
No. of Firms

-7.82
(1.76)
***

-6.43
(1.95)
***

US only

-6.98
(1.15)
***

-5.96
(1.21)
***

Foreign only

-2.29
(0.61)
***

-2.01
(0.66)
***

Total Growth in
No. of Patents

-3.22
(1.22)
**

-1.34
(1.33)

US only

-2.62
(1.19)
**

-1.12
(1.27)

Foreign only

-1.57
(0.50)
***

-1.24
(0.52)
**

Lagged Dummies
if Firm Is in Top 5
AT&T

0.27
(1.08)

0.16
(1.21)

0.32
(1.11)

0.16
(1.25)

-1.09
(1.29)

-1.35
(1.55)

-0.87
(1.35)

-1.16
(1.62)

Motorola

1.76
(0.88)
*

1.36
(0.85)

1.48
(0.93)

1.24
(0.9)

1.26
(1.02)

0.9
(1)

1.12
(1.11)

0.87
(1.06)

IBM

-1.5
(1.55)

-1.69
(1.54)

-1.38
(1.58)

-1.51
(1.58)

-1.12
(1.5)

-1.27
(1.49)

-1.07
(1.53)

-1.13
(1.5)

Time Trend

-3
(0.81)
***

-2.58
(0.77)
***

-3.43
(0.77)
***

-3.06
(0.72)
***

Time Trend Sq.

0.07
(0.04)
*

0.05
-0.04

0.09
(0.04)
**

0.07
(0.04)
*

Intercept

84.52
(5.10)
***

82.7
(4.93)
***

87.74
(4.84)
***

86.1
(4.59)
***

77.56
(4.98)
***

75.5
(4.81)
***

80.18
(4.81)
***

78.01
(4.58)
***

Class Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Fixed Effects

-

-

-

-

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

60%

59%

58%

57%

63%

63%

62%

61%

R-Squared
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Notes: Regressions are ordinary least squares, with S.E. in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively. Standard errors are clustered by class. An observation is a
patent technology class and a two-year time period. N is 450 in odd
numbered models, and 443 in even numbered models. Each model
includes technology class fixed effects. Models 1-4 include a linear and
a quadratic time trend; models 5-8 include time fixed effects. The sample
includes the highest quartile of patents in the period 1976 to 2007 that are
ultimately granted by the USPTO on or before 2010, where quality is
measured by citations received.
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Figure 1: Granted Patents by Application Year

Notes: The sample includes patent applications from thirty patent
technology classes in the ICT equipment industry from 1976 to 2007 that
are ultimately granted on or before 2010, at all levels of patent quality.
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Figure 2: Patent Flow Concentration Levels (Technology Class 385,
Optical Waveguides)

Notes: The sample includes patent applications from the Optical
Waveguides technology class (class 385) from 1976 to 2007 that are
ultimately granted on or before 2010, at all levels of patent quality. The
years are grouped into two year cells. The concentration is measured by
the share of top i firms in terms of patent applications within each twoyear cell, where i ranges from 1 to 25.
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Figure 3: Change in 𝑪𝟐𝟓𝒇𝒍𝒐𝒘 distribution from 1976-77 to 2006-07

Notes: The sample includes patent applications from the thirty ICT
equipment industry patent technology classes from 1976 to 2007 that are
ultimately granted on or before 2010, at all levels of patent quality. The
concentration is measured by the share of top twenty-five firms in terms
of patent applications within each two-year cell.
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Appendix I. Construction of Patent Data
This Study uses patent data constructed from raw USPTO text files for
the period from 1976 to 2010 for a variety of reasons. First, coverage of
the NBER data files ends in 1999 for the inventor variables, and in 2006
for the remainder of the data; our newly constructed data set goes to 2010.
In addition, the NBER data do not include the original names of patent
assignees; instead the data provide assignee names that have gone
through a series of standardizations. We use the original names from the
newly constructed data in the process of linking the patent data to the
M&A data as described below.
Each week the USPTO makes available a new XML file, which can
be accessed on its FTP site, containing bibliographic information for the
patents granted within the prior week. In addition, the USPTO makes
historical files available through the Google Patents Bulk Downloads
site. This Study supplements the NBER patent data period with the XML
files that go back to 2001, and the yearly hierarchical text files that cover
the 1976-2001 period, resulting in the utilization of 474 weekly XML
files and twenty-six yearly text files.91 The newly organized data include
information on granted utility patents applied for and granted between
1976 and 2010, including the application year, grant year, patent
technology class, patent assignee name, location, and type.
In order to verify the data quality, we conduct extensive comparison
of the newly compiled data against NBER patent data files for the
overlapping period. In addition, we compare various aggregate statistics
against the USPTO aggregate patent statistics. Table A1 presents patent
counts by grant year from our data and the USPTO aggregate statistics
page. As observed in the Table, the two datasets follow each other very
closely. Comparisons on other patent properties follow similarly close
trends.
In addition to the main bibliographic items, the USPTO assigns a
primary technology class and a number of secondary technology classes
to each patent at the time of grant. The classification system may be
modified over time due to advances in technologies or other reasons. The
USPTO updates the technology classes of all patents granted since 1790

91. Between 1976 and 2010 the data format changed dramatically, once in 2002 and again in
2005. Some minor changes were also made in 2006. The corresponding variables from various
years were matched using the relevant version of the Redbook documentation from the USPTO
website.
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and publishes them in the MCF once every two months. Our data include
classifications from the December 2010 version of this product.
As in prior work, we take advantage of citations. The patent data
contain the citations made by the granted patents between 1976 and 2010
to other granted patents in earlier periods. This information is used in
controlling for the heterogeneity in patent value, which has a highly
skewed distribution.92 Prior studies have documented a strong, positive
correlation between the value of a patent and the number of citations it
receives.93 In keeping with this literature, we control for the quality of
patents and repeat the analyses on the sample of highly cited patents, in
addition to conducting our analyses on the entire sample of granted
patents.
The main pillar of this Study is the patent ownership composition,
which is constructed using the share of granted patents to each unique
assignee. However, the newly compiled USPTO patent data does not
contain a unique assignee identifier (akin to NBER’s pdpass variable)
that is consistent across different patents and across time. The main
assignee identifier is the firm name, which is a long string and is
susceptible to errors in links due to potential misspellings, different
spelling of foreign firms, and differences in abbreviations. To address
the lack of unique firm identifiers, we developed a methodology to link
different name strings representing the same entity to each other. We
discuss the details of this algorithm and a comparison to NBER’s unique
identifiers in Appendix II.

92. Harhoff et al., supra note 70, at 512 (discussing the highly skewed distribution of values);
Pakes & Schankerman, supra note 70, at 86 (same).
93. See, e.g.,. Harhoff et al., supra note 70.
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Table A1: Granted Utility Patents
Grant
XML
Year
USPTO Compilation Difference
2010
219,614
219,909
295
2009
167,349
167,553
204
2008
157,772
157,894
122
2007
157,282
157,502
220
2006
173,772
173,922
150
2005
143,806
143,927
121
2004
164,290
164,413
123
2003
169,023
169,104
81
2002
167,330
167,424
94
2001
166,035
166,158
123
2000
157,494
157,595
101
1999
153,485
153,592
107
1998
147,517
147,576
59
1997
111,984
112,019
35
1996
109,645
109,653
8
1995
101,419
101,431
12
1994
101,676
101,696
20
1993
98,342
98,384
42
1992
97,444
97,473
29
1991
96,511
96,557
46
1990
90,365
90,421
56
1989
95,537
95,566
29
1988
77,924
77,937
13
1987
82,952
82,967
15
1986
70,860
70,865
5
1985
71,661
71,669
8
1984
67,200
67,215
15
1983
56,860
56,860
0
1982
57,888
57,878
10
1981
65,771
65,766
5
1980
61,819
61,812
7
1979
48,854
48,839
15
1978
66,102
66,084
18
1977
65,269
65,200
69
1976
70,226
70,190
36
Total
3,911,078 3,913,051
2,293
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Notes: Patent counts by grant year from the USPTO aggregate patent
statistics and our newly constructed sample from USPTO XML and text
files. Source: U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Patent Technology Monitoring
Team (PTMT), USPTO.
Last accessed February 22, 2012,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm.
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Appendix II: Firm Name Linking Algorithm
The newly compiled USPTO patent data do not contain a unique
assignee identifier that is consistent across time. The main assignee
identifier is the firm name, which is a long string and is susceptible to
errors in links due to potential misspellings, different spelling of foreign
firms, and differences in abbreviations (such as “corporation,” “co.,” and
“co”). To address the lack of unique firm identifiers, we developed a
methodology to link different name strings representing the same entity
to each other.94
The linking algorithm consists of two stages: an automated stage and
a human intelligence stage. In the automated stage, a computer program
standardizes the firm names using common abbreviations and
misspellings identified from the data, such as “corp,” “corporation,”
“corpooration,” etc. The program then conducts a linking based on
common words in company names. Although this program captures a
significant portion of actual matches across datasets, it also produces
false positives. An example of a false positive would be flagging “ABC
Business Solutions” and “XYZ Business Solutions” as the same
company due to the common “Business Solutions” phrase. To work
around this problem we conduct a human intelligence stage. In this stage
the matches identified by the computer program are fed into a crowdsourcing website, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, for manual human
verification that will un-flag the false positives, and leave only the actual
matches for use in the data linking. 95
As a quality check of this process we compare the results to the NBER
patent data files, which address the same issue only within the patent
data, and mapped 322,783 names into 243,800 unique entities. A
comparison of the results from our algorithm on a sample of 70,000 firm
names to the NBER patent data file suggests that our results are as good
as the NBER matches, if not better.
Differences exist between the two algorithms, partly due to random
errors and partly due to the difference in what is considered a unique
entity. Table A2 provides an illustration through a subset of names for
94. This new variable will assume the role of the NBER patent data’s pdpass variable in our
dataset.
95. Crowdsourcing sites enable the outsourcing of simple tasks to a large group of workers on
demand. In our case, workers see a pair of company names matched by the computer program,
and are asked to simply choose “yes” or “no” to indicate whether the two companies are the same
companies, or not. Outsourcing the linking process to a large workforce and using standard quality
control techniques facilitates the timely completion of the task at a reasonable cost.
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the Sony Corporation. In this list, each line represents a different entity
(different pdpass) in the NBER data, whereas all are considered part of
the same entity in our data. The three versions of “Sony Electronics Inc.”
being assigned to different entities in the NBER data give an example of
random errors in the matching process.96 However, designating “Sony
Corp of America” and “Sony Electronics Inc.” as different entities
highlights differences in what we consider a firm. In this assignment we
believe that firms create different subsidiaries for a variety of reasons,
including tax blueprint, legacy, and other managerial or strategic issues.
However, we conjecture that two such firms would go through patent
infringement issues only under very extreme, unlikely conditions;
therefore we consider them the same entity.

96. Similar cases where a match missed by our algorithm is captured by the NBER also exist
in the data. Table A2 does not indicate superiority of our algorithm over NBER’s.
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Table A2: Assignee Names for SONY Corp.
NBER pdpass NBER Assignee Name
11297047

SONY AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

11277610

SONY BROADCAST & COMMUNICATION

11958546

SONY CHEM CORP

13040458

SONY CHEM CORP NEAGARI PLANT

12059716

SONY CINEMA PROD CORP

12104210

SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAIMENT INC

12805945

SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT AM

13147302

SONY CORP ENTERTAINMENT AMERIC

11205194

SONY CORP OF AMERICA

13171917

SONY CORPORATIOM

21878152

SONY ELECTONICS INC

21589106

SONY ELECTRONIC INC

11399266

SONY ELECTRONICS INC
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Appendix III: ICT Equipment Patent Technology Classes
Considered
Class
178
330
331
332
333
334
340
342
343
348
358
367
370
371
375
379
380
381
385
398
455
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712

Description
Telegraphy
Amplifiers
Oscillators
Modulators
Wave transmission lines and networks
Tuners
Communications: electrical
Communications: directive radio wave systems and devices (e.g., radar, radio
navigation)
Communications: radio wave antennas
Television
Facsimile and static presentation processing
Communications, electrical: acoustic wave systems and devices
Multiplex communications
Error Detection/Correction and Fault Detection/Recovery
Pulse or digital communications
Telephonic communications
Cryptography, subclasses 255 through 276 for a communication system using
cryptography
Electrical Audio Signal Processing Systems and Devices, subclasses 1+ for
broadcast or multiplex stereo
Optical waveguides
Optical communications
Telecommunications
Data processing: generic control systems or specific applications
Data processing: vehicles, navigation, and relative location
Data processing: measuring, calibrating, or testing
Data processing: structural design, modeling, simulation, and emulation
Data processing: speech signal processing, linguistics, language translation, and
audio compression/decompression
Data processing: financial, business practice, management, or cost/price
determination
Data processing: artificial intelligence
Data processing: database and file management or data structures
Electrical computers: arithmetic processing and calculating
Electrical computers and digital processing systems: multicomputer data
transferring
Electrical computers and digital data processing systems: input/output
Electrical computers and digital processing systems: memory
Electrical computers and digital processing systems: processing architectures
and instruction processing (e.g., processors)
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713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
725
726

Electrical computers and digital processing systems: support
Error detection/correction and fault detection/recovery
Data processing: presentation processing of document, operator interface
processing, and screen saver display processing
Data processing: design and analysis of circuit or semiconductor mask
Data processing: software development, installation, and management
Electrical computers and digital processing systems: virtual machine task or
process management or task management/control
Electrical computers and digital processing systems: interprogram
communication or interprocess communication (ipc)
Dynamic optical information storage or retrieval
Interactive video distribution systems
Information security
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